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We may be closer to ‘Peak Elsevier’, but investors and the
stock market need to be spooked by bad publicity before the
company’s practices change.
As the academic boycott of Elsevier grew, the company’s stock
prices fell, but is this really an indication of the future collapse of the
publisher? Cameron Neylon considers the need for a large-scale
scare of investors in order to force the publisher to change its way of
working and wonders how close academics are to ‘Peak Elsevier’.
Understanding how a process looks from outside our own echo chamber can be
useful. It  helps to calibrate our sanity and check our own responses. It  adds an
external perspect ive and, at its best, can save us from our own overly f ixed
ideas. In the case of the ongoing Elsevier Boycott  we even have a perspect ive
that comes from two opposed direct ions.
The two analyst/brokerage f irms Bernstein and Exane Paribas have recently
published reports on their view of how recent events should affect the view of
those invest ing in Reed Elsevier. In the weeks following the start  of the boycott
Elsevier’s stock price dropped – was this an indicat ion of a serious structural
problems in the business revealed by the boycott  (the Bernstein view) or just a
short term over react ion that provides an opportunity for a quick prof it  (the Exane
view)?
Claudio Aspesi from Bernstein has been negative on Elsevier stock for sometime
[see Stephen Curry's post for links], cit ing the structural problem that the
company is stuck in a cycle of publishing more, losing subscript ions, charging
more, and managing to squeeze out a lit t le more prof it  for shareholders in each
cycle. Aspesi has been stat ing for some t ime that this simply can’t  go on. He
also makes the link between the boycott  and a potent ially increased willingness
of libraries to drop subscript ions or abandon big deals altogether. He is
part icularly scathing about the response to the boycott  arguing that Elsevier is
continuing to estrange the researcher community and that this must ult imately be
disastrous. In part icular the report focuses on the claims management have
made of their ability to shif t  the cost base away from libraries and onto
researchers based on “excellent relat ions with researchers”.
The Exane view on the other hand is that this is a storm in a teacup [summary at
John Baez's G+]. They point to the relat ively small number of researchers signing
up to the boycott , part icularly in the context of the much larger numbers involved
in similar pledges in 2001 and 2007. In doing this I feel they are missing the point
– that the environment of those boycotts was ent irely dif ferent both in terms of
disciplines and target ing but an object ive observer might well view me as biased.
I do however f ind this report complacent on details – claiming as it  does that the
“low take-up of this pet it ion is a sign of the scient if ic community’s improving
perception of Elsevier”, an indicat ion of a lack of real data on researcher
sentiment. They appear to have bought the Elsevier line on “excellent relat ions”
uncrit ically – and what I see on the ground is barely suppressed fury that is
increasingly boiling over. It  also focuses on Open Access as a threat – not an
opportunity – for Elsevier, a view which would certainly lead me to discount their
long term views on the company’s stock price. Their judgment for me is brought
even further into quest ion by the following:
“In our DCF terminal value, we capture the Open Access risk by assuming the
pricing models f lip to Gold Open Access with average revenue per art icle of
USD3,000. Even on that assumption, we f ind value in the shares.”
Pricing the risk at this level is risible. The not ion that Elsevier could f lip to an
author pays model by charging $US3000 per each art icle is absurd. The poor
take up of the current Elsevier opt ions and the massive growth of PLoS ONE and
clones at half  this price sets a clear price point, and one that is likely a high water
mark for journal APCs. If  there is value in the shares at $3000 then I can’t  help
but feel there won’t  be very much at a likely end point price well below $1000.
However both reports appear to me to fail to recognize one very important
aspect of the situat ion – its volat ility. As I understand it  these f irms make their
names by being right when they take posit ions away from the consensus. Thus
they have a tendency to report their views as certaint ies. In this case I think the
situat ion could swing either way very suddenly. As the Bernstein report notes, the
defect ion of editorial staff  from Elsevier journals is the most signif icant risk. A
single board defect ion from a middle to high ranking journal – or a signal from a
major society journal that they will not renew an Elsevier contract – could very
easily start  a landslide that ends Elsevier’s dominance as the largest research
publisher. Equally, nothing much could happen which would certainly likely lead to
a short term rally in stock prices. But no-one is in a posit ion to guess how this is
going to play out.
In the long term I side with Aspesi – I see nothing in the overall tenor of Elsevier’s
posit ion statements that suggests to me that they really understand either the
research community, the environment, or how it  is changing. Their pricing model
for hybrid opt ions seems almost designed to fail. As mandates strengthen it
appears the company is likely to continue to f ight them rather than adapt. But to
accept my analysis you need to believe my view that the subscript ion business
model is no longer f it  for purpose.
What this shows, more than anything else, is that the place where the batt le for
change will ult imately be fought out is in stock market. While Elsevier continues
to tell its shareholders that it  can deliver continuing prof it  growth from scholarly
publishing with a subscript ion business model – it  will be trapped into defending
that business model against all threats. The Research Works Act is a part of that
f ight – as will be attempts to block simple and global mandates by funders on
researchers in other places. While the shareholders believe that the status quo
can continue the senior management of the company is trapped by a legacy
mindset. Until shareholders accept that the company needs to take a short-term
haircut the real investment required for change seems unlikely. And I don’t  meant
a few million here or there. I mean a full year’s prof its ploughed back into the
company over a few years to allow for root and branch change.
The irony seems that large-scale change requires that the investors get
spooked. For that to happen something has to go very publicly wrong. The
uproar over the support of SOPA and RWA is not, yet, enough to convince the
analysts beyond Aspesi that something is seriously wrong. It  is an interest ing
question what would be. My sense is that nothing big enough will come along
soon enough and that those structural issues will gradually come into play leading
to a long term decline. It  may be that we are very near ‘Peak Elsevier’. Your
mileage, of course, may vary.
This piece was originally published on Cameron Neylon’s personal blog ‘Science
in the Open’.
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